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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SERGIO RENAGA-GUTIERREZ, : Case No. 20010141-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED RENAGA-
GUTIRREZ'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A. Renaga-Gutierrez Has Met the Marshaling Requirement on Appeal. 
Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, Appellant Sergio Renaga-Gutierrez 
("Renaga-Gutierrez") met his marshaling requirement on appeal. See State's Brief 
("SB") at Point LA. The marshaling rule requires that appellants "marshal the evidence 
in support of the verdict." State v. Rudolph. 2000 UT App 155, ^ fl8, 3 P.3d 192 
(citations omitted). Renaga-Gutierrez did just this in his opening brief, marshaling all the 
facts, spanning two pages, which supported the prosecution. See Appellant's Brief 
("AB") at 11-13. Notably, Renaga-Gutierrez did not mention the evidence which most 
strongly supported his innocence, such as Ignacio Acevedo's ("Acevedo") testimony that 
Renaga-Gutierrez did not sell him drugs or his mother's testimony that the money found 
on his person was the proceeds from an earlier car sale rather than drug dealing. Idj cf. 
Deiavue. Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, |^13, 993 P.2d 222 (Appellant's 
claim of insufficient evidence to support punitive damage award would not be considered 
on appeal because of its failure to Marshall all evidence supporting award;. . . appellant 
instead stated only those facts most favorable to its position). Accordingly, Renaga-
Gutierrez fulfilled his marshaling duty on appeal. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, 
1J24,973P.2d431. 
B. The Fully Marshalled Evidence Does Not Establish the Elements of 
Distribution. 
The State contends that Renaga-Guiterrez erroneously attempts to make actual or 
constructive possession an element of distribution, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii), since he made an argument under that legal theory in his opening brief. See 
SB Point LB.. The State misreads Renaga-Gutierrez's analysis on appeal. 
As the State asserts, actual or constructive possession is not an element of the 
crime of distribution with which he was charged. The elements of that offense, quoted in 
Renaga-Gutierrez's opening brief, see. AB 11, are the knowing and intentional 
distribution of a controlled or counterfeit substance, or the agreement, consent, offer, or 
arranging thereof. See § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, the absence of any evidence of 
Renaga-Gutierrez's actual or constructive possession of drugs is relevant. See, e.g.. State 
v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,1J3, 3 P.3d 725 (considering fact that defendant did not 
have drugs on him at time of arrest in holding that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a bindover on the charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance). 
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Indeed, even the trial court understood its relevance to the extent that it instructed the 
jury on actual and constructive possession. R.l 17 (Instruction 13). If he did not have 
any drugs on him, then the inference that he sold the drugs to Acevedo is significantly 
weakened and makes the link between Renaga-Gutierrez's observed behavior and the 
assumption that he sold drugs too speculative and slight to support the State's case. Id. at 
fflf 14-20. This is especially true where the other evidence points to his innocence. For 
instance, Renaga-Gutierrez was not found with a large stash of drugs on him as would be 
expected of a person selling drugs. Acevedo testified that Renaga-Gutierrez did not sell 
drugs to him, and that he bought the drugs found on his own person earlier that day from 
someone else. Renaga-Gutierrez's mother testified that he had a large sum of cash on 
him because he sold his car a few days earlier for $2000. 
The absence of evidence establishing actual or constructive possession is 
particularly telling given that the only testimony against Renaga-Guiterrez was too 
speculative, inconsistent, and slight to support the distribution charge. Detective Purvis 
could only say that the interaction he saw transpire between Renaga-Gutierrez and 
Acevedo resembled a hand-to-hand drug transaction based on his experience as an 
undercover vice officer. R.160[47]. He did not actually see any drugs in Renaga-
Gutierrez's hands and never noticed any white substance until after Acevedo walked 
away. R.160[73]. 
Although Purvis testified that he saw Renaga-Gutierrez holding money, his 
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testimony as to if and how it changed hands is inconsistent. He testified that he saw them 
make a two-handed hand shake and that he saw the money change hands. R.160[44,72]. 
He also said that he did not see who originally held the money. IcL However, Purvis 
wrote in his incident report that Renaga-Gutierrez pulled the money from Acevedo's 
hand. R. 160[59]. He testified at the preliminary hearing that he never saw Acevedo with 
the money in hand. R. 160[72-73]. 
In short, the lack of evidence showing Renaga-Gutierrez's actual or constructive 
possession of the drugs that he allegedly distributed is but one of many pertinent factors 
in this case that render the State's evidence insufficient to support the conviction. See, 
e.g., Hester, 2000 UT App 159 at 1J3; see_AB Point I (fully discussing insufficiency of 
evidence). This fact is especially compelling considering that the evidence against him is 
purely circumstantial and based solely on Detective Purvis' unparticularized hunch and 
inconsistent testimony that a hand-to-hand drug deal occurred. As so aptly stated in 
Hester, "'[w]hen the correlation between the predicate facts and the conclusion is slight, 
then the inference is less reasonable, and 'at some point, the link between the facts and 
the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it 'speculation'"" and the evidence 
becomes insufficient to support the distribution charge. 2000 UTApp 159 at ^ [17 
(quotations omitted). 
In light of the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in Renaga-Gutierrez's 
opening brief, Point I, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict 
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where there was insufficient competent evidence to support the distribution charge. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPTED 
POSSESSION. 
A. An Innocence Defense Does Not Preclude the Trial Court from 
Submitting a Lesser Included Offense Instruction That Is Appropriately 
Based in the Evidence. 
The State asserts that the trial court properly denied a lesser included offense 
instructions on attempted possession of a controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. §§58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000) & 76-4-101 (1999), and solicitation, Salt Lake City Ord. 
11.12.100 (1996), because Renaga-Gutierrez maintained his innocence as to the 
distribution charge. SB Point II. The State cites State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983), State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 
1984), and State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998), in support of the proposition 
that "where the prosecution's evidence supports conviction and defendant's evidence 
acquittal, no lesser included offense instruction is warranted." SB 20. 
The State's argument has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983), which upheld the right of the trial court to 
submit a lesser included offense instruction even where the defense theory is that of total 
innocence. IcL at 145. The defendant in that case was originally charged with 
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manslaughter. IcL at 144. The court determined that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the manslaughter charge, but instructed counsel to prepare arguments on the 
lesser included offense of negligent homicide. Id. After hearing those arguments, the 
"judge entered a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide." Id. 
The defendant contested the submission of the lesser included offense. Id. at 145. 
He argued that he sought acquittal on the original manslaughter charge on an "'all or 
nothing' defense theory, i.e., that [he was] totally innocent" and that the "trial court 
[could not] consider a lesser included offense absent a specific request by the defendant." 
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In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]his Court has 
recognized on numerous occasions the prerogative of the trial court to submit or consider 
lesser included offenses whenever the interest of justice so requires." IcLat 145 (citing 
State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 13377 (Utah 1977): State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 
1982); State v. Close, 499 P.2d 287 (Utah 1972)). The Court noted that defendant cited 
authority which merely held that a trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense "where the defendant fails to request [it] or provide any 
evidentiary basis therefor; it did not, however, argue [] that the trial court is precluded 
from instructing the jury on a lesser included offense where the defendant employs an 'all 
or nothing' defense theory." Id. 
The State's position is without merit for the same reasons that defeated the 
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defendant's position in Dyer. The State does not cite any authority precluding 
instructions on lesser included offenses simply because a defendant maintains his 
innocence at trial. Instead, the State cites State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result), a case where the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial 
court's refusal to submit a jury instruction on manslaughter for a defendant who was 
charged with second degree murder. IcLat 790. The defendant in that case maintained 
that he was not the victim's killer. LI In dicta, the Court stated, ''[defendant's own 
theory of the defense precluded the requested instmction on manslaughter. The evidence 
offered the jury only the choice between finding defendant innocent or guilty of the 
crime charged.... Defendant claimed that he did not commit the act, not that the killing 
was anything less than intentional." Id. (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159-60 
(Utah 1983)). 
Nonetheless, the Shabata Court did not base its holding upon any general 
prohibition against lesser-included offenses where the defendant asserts innocence. IdL 
Specifically relying on the evidence-based standard and looking to the record, the Court 
noted the evidence that overwhelmingly suggested murder. IcLat 790. "Here the 
believable evidence showed that defendant purchased a gun and was concerned about 
whether it was powerful enough to kill a person. The victim's multiple gunshot wounds 
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are evidence of his assailant's intent to kill." Id.1 Accordingly, the evidence did not 
support an instruction on manslaughter, which presumed a "less than intentional" act. Id 
The State also misrelies on State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), for the 
erroneous proposition that an innocence defense necessarily precludes a lesser included 
offense instruction. See SB 19. Baker established the elements/evidence-based standard 
for lesser included instructions, but in no way holds that they are precluded by an 
innocence defense. IcLat 159. In fact, the Court in Baker incorporated the evidence-
based standard into the analysis in order to protect against the risk of a verdict based only 
on a jury's compassion or leniency, recognizing that a defendant's right to a lesser 
included instruction is not "absolute or unlimited." Id.at 157. As noted in Baker, fc6[t]he 
1
 Additional evidence not cited by the Shabata Court in its opinion but presented 
at trial also overwhelmingly suggested defendant's guilt for the murder charge. For 
example, the defendant, a Libyan national, was apprehended at Chicago's airport 
boarding a flight to Libya on the same day that the victim's body was found. Id.at 786. 
Defendant asked several friends to purchase a gun for him. IcL. A witness testified that 
he bought the a .22 caliber gun and shells, and delivered it to defendant. Id . Two 
witnesses testified that they dropped the victim off at defendant's apartment. Id.at 787. 
Nonetheless, when asked about the victim's whereabouts, defendant claimed that he did 
not see the victim there, or that he must have been taking a shower even though 
defendant's apartment only has a bath. IcL The victim's body was found in the trunk of 
his car. Id A set of the victim's car keys were found in defendant's knapsack when he 
was arrested. Id A blood stain was found on the carpet padding in defendant's 
apartment, as well as a .22 caliber bullet fragment that pierced and fell behind a kitchen 
drawer. Id In light of this evidence, there was no rational basis for acquitting defendant 
of the murder charge and convicting him of manslaughter, i.e., that he killed the victim in 
the heat of passion. See State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983) (standard of 
review for granting or denying lesser included offense instructions). 
Shabata factually distinguishable from the present case. 
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defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is limited by the evidence 
presented at trial. This limitation requires the application of the evidence-based 
standard." IdL (emphasis added). Hence, the evidence-based standard provides a built-in 
protection against the State's so-called "compromise verdict[s]," SB 19; this analysis will 
ferret out meritless lesser included offense instructions regardless of the defense theory. 
The State's argument is not only unsupported in case law, but goes against sound 
policy as well. Defendants have a constitutional right to present their defenses so long as 
they are grounded in the evidence, even if they are seemingly inconsistent. See U.S. 
Const, amend. V & XIV (Due Process); Utah Constitution art. I, § 7 (same). It is not 
outside the bounds of zealous advocacy to argue that the defendant is not guilty of any 
offense, but even if he was he was only guilty of the lesser. Moreover, It is not for the 
court or the State on appeal to second guess defense theory when a defendant requests a 
lesser included instruction. See, e.g. State v. Pascual 804 P.2d 553, *556 -557 (holding 
that counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he switched defense theories; 
"[t]he change in defense appears to be nothing more than a change in strategy. We 'will 
not second-guess a trial attorney's legitimate use of judgment as to trial tactics or 
strategy.' We believe any election between inconsistent defenses was a legitimate 
exercise of trial strategy rather than ineffective assistance of counsel") (quoting State v. 
Wight. 765 P.2d 12 at 15 (Utah App. 1988); citing State v. Morehouse. 748 P.2d217, 219 
(Utah App. 1988)). 
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It must be noted in this case, however, that claiming innocence as to distribution is 
consistent with a lesser included offense on attempted possession or solicitation. 
Especially in cases based on circumstantial evidence like the present, a drug sale may 
easily be confused with a drug buy. The transactions are often conducted so covertly that 
it is difficult to distinguish the sellers from the buyers unless an observing officer is 
directly involved as an undercover agent or is closer to the action than the officers in this 
case. 
In fact, Detective Purvis' testimony in this regard is so uncertain that it is quite 
conceivable that he mistook Renaga-Gutierrez as the seller. Purvis was in a semi-lit 
parking lot at night when he observed from a distance the two men together and a 
handshake between them. R.160[39,44]. He could not say with specificity who passed 
money to who, and he did not see any items resembling drugs until Acevedo walked 
away. R.160[73]. He did not see the drugs pass from Renaga-Gutierrez to Acevedo, or 
hear any incriminating conversation, in order to conclusively state that Renaga-Gutierrez 
had in sold the drugs. R.160[44-45,73-74]. To the extent that the jury believed that 
Renaga-Gutierrez was involved in a drug transaction, it is reasonably conceivable that he 
was the attempting to possess or solicit rather than distributing drugs. Accordingly, his 
claim of innocence as to the distribution is compatible with his request for a lesser 
included offense instruction on attempted possession or solicitation. See, e.g.. People v. 
Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913 (Calif. 1974) (noting that when there is evidence at trial that the 
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defendant is guilty not of the crime charged, but of a lesser included offense, the court 
must instruct on the lesser offense even when the defendant claims to be innocent of both 
the greater and the lesser). 
It is under just such ambiguous evidence that lesser included instructions are 
effective tools in the truth-finding process: 
M[C]ourts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth." 
Truth may lie neither with the defendant's protestations of innocence nor 
with the prosecution's assertion that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged, but at a point between these two extremes: the evidence may show 
that the defendant is guilty of some intermediate offense included within, 
but lesser than, the crime charged. A trial court's failure to inform the jury 
of its option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense would impair 
the jury's truth ascertainment function . . . [and] would force the jury to 
make an "all or nothing" choice between conviction of the crime charged or 
complete acquittal, thereby denying the jury the opportunity to decide 
whether the defendant is guilty of a lesser included offense established by 
the evidence. 
People v. Barton, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 574 (Calif. 1995) (quotation omitted); see also 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-57 (noting that juries tend to resolve doubt as to guilt in favor of 
conviction despite their theoretical duty to not convict unless there is proof beyond 
reasonable doubt; lesser included offense instructions shield defendant's against this risk 
by giving juries another conviction option) (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 
212-13 (1973)) (full quote cited in Renaga-Gutierrez's opening brief at p.30). 
B. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Grant a Lesser Included Offense 
Instruction on the Municipal Offense of Solicitation. 
In footnote 14 to its brief, the State erroneously asserts that the trial court did not 
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have jurisdiction to submit a lesser included offense instruction on the municipal offense 
of solicitation. It cites a string of city and state ordinances comparing the legislative 
authorities at municipal and state levels, and the accountability and revenue flow from 
city and state attorneys to their respective governing entities. See SB n.14. 
Nothing in the statutes cited by the State prohibits a district attorney from 
prosecuting the municipal crime of solicitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-701 
(providing that municipalities shall exercise legislative powers through ordinances); Salt 
Lake City Ord. § 2.08.040 (outlining functions of city attorney but never expressly or 
impliedly prohibiting a district attorney from prosecuting a city offense); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-716 (providing that fines and forfeitures be paid into municipal treasury; no 
prohibition on district attorney prosecuting crimes that generate such funds); Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-18-1.7 (granting district attorney prosecuting authority for public offenses 
except where already undertaken by the city; does not prohibit him or her from 
prosecuting public offenses, such as the current solicitation offense, that are not taken up 
by the city); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-5 (does not prohibit district attorney from 
prosecuting city ordinance, only provides that state ordinance will be prosecuted in the 
name of the state of Utah and municipal ordinances will be prosecuted in the name of the 
government involved); Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (Supp. 2001) (providing municipalities 
authority to pass ordinances and rules necessary for the administration of the city; does 
not discuss limits on prosecuting authority of city or state prosecutors). 
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Consequently, the State's argument does not undermine the constitutional and 
statutory framework that allows district attorneys, and by extension the trial court below, 
to enforce a city ordinance through the submission of a lesser included offense on the 
municipal crime of solicitation. See AB 29-33 (discussing constitutional provisions and 
statutes providing for the district attorney's authority to seek conviction on the municipal 
crime of solicitation).2 
C. Failure to Give the Lesser Included Offense Instructions Constitutes 
Reversible Prejudicial Error. 
The trial court's failure to grant the requested lesser included instructions on 
attempted possession and solicitation amount to reversible prejudicial error. .See State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 871-72 (Utah 1998) (concluding that any error in refusing 
lesser included offense instruction was harmless). "For an error to require reversal, 'the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict."' State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah App. 1996) (quotation omitted). 
First, the error was prejudicial because the evidence, as discussed infra and at 
length in the opening brief, AB Points I & II, the evidence in support of distribution was 
weak, and the jury would have likely convicted on one of the lesser offenses had it had 
2
 The State concedes that the trial court erroneously denied the lesser included 
offense instruction on attempted possession on the basis that it is only a legal fiction. See 
SB n.14; see also R. 161 [123]. Attempted possession, as noted by the State and in 
Renaga-Gutierrez's opening brief is an actual crime under Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (possession) & 76-4-101 (attempt). See AB 22-23; SB n.14. 
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the opportunity to do so. See, e.g. State v. lore. 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Utah App. 1990) 
(reversing for prejudicial error where state's evidence was uncorroborated and 
inconsistent). The case against Renaga-Gutierrez was circumstantial and Detective 
Purvis' testimony was weak and inconsistent. He was observed in a restroom in a bar 
talking to a man, R.160[29-31], and then in a semi-lit parking lot with Acevedo as they 
made a double-handed hand shake and talked for a bit. R.160[43-44]. Detective Purvis 
could not testify with certainty that he saw Renaga-Gutierrez accept money from 
Acevedo. R.160[72]. He never saw Renaga-Gutierrez pass drugs to Acevedo. 
R.160[73]. In fact, he did not notice any drugs until after Acevedo walked away. Id 
When Renaga-Gutierrez was arrested, he was found with money, but not a stash of drugs 
on him as would be expected of a drug dealer. R.160[85]. He did not attempt to flee 
when the arresting officers told him to stop. R. 160[81-85]. In addition, Acevedo 
testified that Renaga-Gutierrez did not sell or buy any drugs. R.160[102]. Moreover, 
Renaga-Gutierrez's mother testified that he had a large sum of cash on him not because of 
drug sales, but because he had just sold his car a few days earlier. R.160[l 14]. 
The harmful effect in this case is amplified given that the jury only had the option 
of convicting on the charged offense of distribution or absolute acquittal. See R.l 10-27 
(Jury Instructions); cf State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, |^29 (failure to give lesser included 
instruction on manslaughter was harmless where jury was given instruction on lesser 
included offense of murder yet convicted defendant of the charged offense of aggravated 
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murder). As noted in Baker, despite their theoretical duty to acquit if the State has not 
met its burden of proof, juries nonetheless tend to resolve doubts in favor of conviction 
when it appears that defendant is guilty of something if not the charged offense. See 671 
P.2d at 156-57 (citation omitted). Absent the option to convict on the lesser offenses of 
attempted possession or solicitation, the jury in this case likely resolved its doubts as to 
Renaga-Gutierrez's claims of absolute innocence in favor of conviction, even if it did not 
necessarily believe that he was guilty of distribution. Accordingly, the trial court's error 
in failing to give the requested lesser included instructions is reversible prejudicial error. 
See Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d at 871-72. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in his opening brief, 
Renaga-Gutierrez respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand 
this case to the trial court. 
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